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The EU Seasonal Workers Directive: When Immigration Controls Meet Labour Rights 
 







On 26 February 2014, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 
adopted the Directive on the Conditions of Entry and Stay of Third-country Nationals for 
the Purpose of Seasonal Work (the Seasonal Workers Directive), which requires Member 
States to transpose the directive by 30 September 2016.
1
 The Directive sets out rules for 
entry and stay for seasonal workers who are not EU citizens. It also establishes a common 
set of rights to which seasonal workers are entitled during their stay in the EU. The 
Directive seeks to respond to the needs of Member States for a source of labour to fill the 
low skill, seasonal, and, typically, precarious, jobs, that are not attractive to EU residents 
and citizens, while simultaneously minimizing the possibility of ‘economic and social 
exploitation’ of the third-country migrant workers by providing them with the set of 
rights, including the employment rights to which resident seasonal workers are entitled. 
At the same time, the Directive is designed to promote circular migration and to ensure 
that these low-skilled workers do not become permanent residents of the EU, while also 




What makes the Directive distinctive from an international perspective is that it is a 
supranational regulation for low-skilled temporary migration that gestures towards a 
circular migration program. The Directive is a binding legal instrument that limits the 
discretion of member states to impose admission criteria and requirements of stay on 
third-country seasonal workers, although it leaves the actual numbers admitted within the 
jurisdiction of the Member State.
3
 It is this constraint on national sovereignty over 
admission criteria and conditions of stay that is relatively rare in a binding international 
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 From the standpoint of the EU, which is itself a sui generis supranational 
political and legal institution, what is remarkable about the Directive is the extent to 
which it combines immigration law, which regulates entry and stay in a territory, with 
labour law, which governs the rights of workers. We argue that these two distinguishing 
features of the Directive are clearly discernable in its substantive provisions and that 
these provisions exemplify the tension between immigration and labour regulation in a 
supranational context. Moreover, we claim that this tension, which is exacerbated by the 
different interests and expertise of the various EU institutions involved in the drafting and 
adoption of the Directive, tends to compromise the achievement of several of the EU’s 
explicit objectives in adopting the Directive, namely, the establishment of a level playing 
field for the recruitment of seasonal migrant workers across the Member States, a truly 
circular managed migration program, and the protection of migrant workers from 
economic and social exploitation.  
 
This paper is primarily concerned with evaluating the extent to which the Directive meets 
this final objective. We begin by providing a brief overview of the history of the 
Directive and discussing some consequences of this treaty basis. The successive 
incarnations of the Directive over the three and a half years that elapsed from the 
Commission’s initial proposal to its adoption illustrates the extent to which various 
institutions emphasized different, and not always compatible, objectives, and how these 
objectives changed over time. This context helps us to explain the content of the 
Directive, which we examine in the subsequent section. We divide the provisions 
contained in the Directive into two general types: those pertaining directly to immigration 
(conditions for admission and stay) and those we characterize as the ‘labour law’ 
elements of the Directive (protections of migrant workers from economic and social 
exploitation). We also discuss hybrid provisions in which immigration controls are used 
to enforce migrant workers rights. Since our primary focus is on the ‘labour protection’ 
elements in the Directive, we compare it with other EU directives on labour migration 
and with relevant International Labour Organization (ILO) standards. In our analysis, we 
emphasize the distinctive EU-drafting style extensively utilized throughout the Directive, 
in which general mandatory provisions (‘shall’ clauses) are followed by permissive 
provisions (‘may’ clauses). This style allows the Members States a considerable margin 
of appreciation when it comes to transposing the Directive, and we suggest that this, now 
quite common, technique, which is attributable to, the increasingly fissiparous nature of 
the enlarged EU, accounts for the Directive’s ambiguity. We conclude by summarising 
the main goals embodied in the adopted Directive and speculating on what the adoption 
of this Directive means for the future of the EU’s immigration policy. 
 
II. The Institutional and Legal Context of the Seasonal Workers Directive 
 
1. The Background and Aims of a Seasonal Workers Directive 
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 The provisions on free movement on workers within the EU itself (Article 45 TFEU) is 
a unique aspect of a common market agreement, and for this reason there is a logic 
behind the adoption of a common immigration policy.  
 3 
Issues pertaining to immigration were first identified as ‘matters of common interest’ 
through the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, and provisions providing for the adoption of acts 
within this field were included in the ‘third pillar’, Title IV in the Treaty on European 
Union, on cooperation on justice and home affairs. The Council of Ministers adopted a 
non-binding resolution on admission rules of third country nationals for the purposes of 
employment in 1994, and in 1997 the Commission proposed a Convention on rules on 
admission that was later dropped.
5
 These tepid initiatives reflected the view that there 
was little need for third country nationals.
6
 However, when competence over immigration 
was transferred to the EU through the Treaty of Amsterdam EU immigration instruments 
began to be proposed.  
 
A new strategy to increase the competitiveness of the European Union was required in 
light of demographic change and labour and skill shortages. The Tampere European 
Council in 1999 emphasized the need for rapid decisions on ‘the approximation of 
national legislations on the conditions for admission and residence of third country 
nationals based on a shared assessment of the economic and demographic developments 
within the Union as well as the situation in the countries of origin’.7 The main focus was 
to ensure that the European labour market functioned as efficiently as possible. However, 
another aim was to secure legal status for temporary workers who intended to return to 
their countries of origin, while at the same time providing a pathway leading eventually 
to a permanent status for those who wished to stay and who met certain criteria. The idea 
was that admitted workers should be provided with broadly the same rights and 




These aspirations were part of an overall ambition to develop a common EU policy on 
asylum and migration.
9
 Not surprisingly, therefore, the Commission’s first proposal to 
regulate labour migration in 2001
10
 was characterized by uniform admission rules 
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intended to replace national labour migration schemes.
11
 Member States, however, did 
not share these far-reaching ambitions, and the Commission had to withdraw its proposal 
in the face of their criticism that it went too far in proposing harmonized admission 
criteria for labour migrants. The requirement for unanimity on the Council in order to 





Encouraged by the European Council in The Hague,
13
 the Commission maintained its 
ambition to adopt a policy plan for economic migration, but this time it adopted a new 
strategy. After in-depth consultations with the Member States and other stakeholders, it 
presented a policy plan for legal migration in 2005, stressing that certain sectors were 
already experiencing substantial labour and skill shortages that could not be filled within 
the national labour markets and citing Eurostat projections of even worse shortages in the 
future.
14
 The Commission also emphasized the possibility that the admission of third-





The 2005 package only addressed the conditions and the procedures of admission for few 
selected categories of economic immigrants.
16
 One of these categories was seasonal 
workers, who were considered to be regularly needed in certain sectors, mainly 
agriculture, building, and tourism. The proposal was intended to provide Member States 
with a supply of labour while simultaneously granting a secure legal status and a regular 
work prospects for the immigrants protecting a particularly vulnerable category of 
workers, and contributing to the development of the countries of origin.
17
 The 
Commission argued that even with high unemployment, few EU citizens and residents 
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 Ibid 4-5. The sectors are highly skilled immigrants, seasonal workers, and intra-
corporate transfers. Also a Framework directive including a single application procedure 
and a set of rights for labour migrants was proposed. These proposals have led to adopted 
directives (fn 45 and 89). 
17
 Ibid 7 with reference to COM(2005)390 on Migration and Development: Some 
concrete orientations. 
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were willing to engage in seasonal activities and, thus, admitting this category of 




In parallel to these discussions on harmonized rules for the admission of seasonal 
workers from third countries, the Commission was considering the links between 
migration and development. It examined the possibility of defining a general framework 
for the entrance and short-term stay of seasonal migrants.
19
 In 2007, a communication on 
circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third 
countries was adopted, which identified mobility partnership agreements between the EU 
and specific third countries that would, for example, facilitate the access of these 
nationals to Member States’ labour markets as the way forward.20 Mobility partnerships 
were regarded as a way of fostering circular migration.
21
 Multi-annual residence/work 
permits for seasonal migrants, allowing them to come back several years in a row to 
perform seasonal work, was the main measure to foster circularity.
22





Before the Commission could actually propose a directive pertaining to the admission of 
seasonal workers from third countries it needed a legislative route that did not require  (as 
under the Amsterdam Treaty) a unanimous decision by the Council. The entering into 
force of the Treaty of the Functioning on the European Union (TFEU) in late 2009 
provided that the exercise of competence over immigration was through the ordinary 
legislative process where the Council adopts decisions by qualified majority and in 
agreement with the European Parliament. Without this change, it is doubtful that the 




In 2010, the Commission proposed a text for a directive on seasonal employment.
25
 Its 
explanatory memorandum reiterated the need for seasonal work in the EU, for which a 
supply of such labour from within the EU was expected to become less and less 
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 In the impact assessment the Commission’s staff also emphasized the extent 
to which migrant workers were already employed in the agricultural sector in the 
Member States, noting that a large proportion were irregular migrants.
27
 The directive 
would provide a route of lawful economic immigration for this group of seasonal workers 
and thus encourage legal, as opposed to irregular, migration.
28
   
 
The impact assessment also stressed the importance of establishing a level playing field 
across the Member States. At least 20 Member States had specialized, and widely 
diverging, admission schemes for seasonal workers. This wide divergence was regarded 
as hindering the efficient allocation of seasonal workers since migrant workers would 
most likely be attracted to Member States with easier admission or renewal rules (or 
where detection of irregular status was less likely), instead of going to where their work 
was needed most.
29
 The desire of Member States to maintain prevailing (low) wages in 
seasonal sectors did not make it into the Commission’s proposal, although it was 





2. The Treaty Basis and its Influence on the Initial Framing of the Seasonal Workers 
Directive 
 
The Seasonal Workers Directive is based on Article 79.2 a and b in the TFEU, which 
gives the EU competence to legislate with respect to the conditions of entry and residence 
and on the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member State.
31
 It was 
adopted by the ordinary legislative process (Articles 79, 2; 289 and 294 TFEU), which 
meant that the Council and the European Parliament had to agree on the outcome and that 
the Council decision was subject to the qualified majority. This legislative process gave 
the European Parliament a very prominent role, which it used to strengthen the labour 
protection provisions. Moreover, the fact that the qualified majority, and not consensus, 
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32
 Ibid, 177. 
 7 
The legal basis under which the Directive was adopted situated it within immigration 
policy and this policy context influenced the specific entity in each of the EU institutions 
that had responsibility for negotiating the Directive. Within the Commission, the 
Directorate of Home affairs and Commissioner Malmström were responsible for the 
Directive.
33
 The fact that the original proposal was elaborated within Commissioner 
Malmström’s cabinet helps to explain why the initial provisions limiting Member States’ 
control over their borders were so far reaching and the labour law provisions were so 
weak.  
 
Although the Commission claimed that the initial proposal protected seasonal migrant 
workers from economic and social exploitation, in reality, the initial draft would not have 
achieved this goal. Not only was the absence of a firm commitment to equality for 
seasonal migrant workers criticized by the ILO, other EU institutional actors also 
supported a robust equal treatment approach for seasonal workers as a crucial step in 
protecting these workers from economic and social exploitation.
34
 Moreover, it is likely 
that if the original proposal had been adopted it would have been in violation of basic 





The main thrust of the original proposal was to provide a labour supply for the internal 
market in order to foster economic growth.
36
 The goal was to abolish obstacles to the 
EU’s productivity, and the admission rules (Articles 5 and 11), rapid (maximum of 30 
days) admission procedures (Article 13.1), and a facilitated re-admission procedure 
(Article 12) in the original proposal were designed to achieve it. Since these provisions 
would have had far-reaching implications for Member States’ ability to control their 
borders, Member States considered them too intrusive. For the first time, the Commission 
faced significant direct opposition to one of its initiatives from national parliaments under 
the ‘yellow card’ procedure newly introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 6 of the 
amended Protocol 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality). The Commission can be compelled under this procedure to review its 
proposal if at least one-third of national parliaments state within eight weeks of the date 
of its transmission that they consider that the proposal does not comply with the principle 
of subsidiarity.
37
 Despite missing the deadline for forcing a review, the Member States 
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III. Analysis of the Seasonal Workers Directive 
 
1. Immigration Controls 
 
Although Member States are free under the Directive to determine the volume of 
admissions, if a Member State decides to admit seasonal workers, it is bound to adopt a 
procedure that is consistent with the Directive. The system is employer-driven, subject to 
the Member State’s overarching authority to set the number of entrants and impose a 
labour market test (Article 8.3), and it is intended to facilitate a supply of seasonal 
workers to fill an unmet demand. As the following discussion illustrates, while the 
Commission was concerned to harmonize admission criteria and to create transparent and 
simple rules, the Parliament’s chief objective was to add criteria for admitting seasonal 
workers and reasons for withdrawing employers’ permission to employ them that were 
designed to protect the migrant workers from potential exploitation. Member States, on 
the other hand, wanted to avoid administrative burdens in the admissions process, as well 
as to retain control over the decision over which migrants would be allowed to enter their 
territory.  
 
Member States and the Commission shared an interest in combating irregular migration – 
a theme that was also evident in the negotiations.
38
 However, they differed over the 
appropriate means to achieve this end. The Commission, along with the European 
Parliament, wanted to promote circular migration since the entitlement to return the 
following year was seen as a carrot to encourage seasonal workers go back home. The 
European Parliament went even further, proposing that during a transitional period 
irregular migrants would be given the right to apply for a seasonal work permit from 
inside of a Member State.
39
 But, Member States would not accept these incentives as the 
appropriate means for combating irregularity, preferring instead to use sticks. 
 
The Scope of the Directive  
The Directive only applies to third-country nationals who reside outside the territory of 
the Member States (Article 2.1). Two key concerns arose during the negotiation over the 
scope of the Directive. The European Parliament wanted to ensure that the sectors 
covered by the Directive were specified, and that any extension of the Directive to new 
                                                                                                                                                                     
‘Justice and Home Affairs,’ (2011) 49 Journal of Common Market Studies 145-164, 152. 
38
 From the beginning, combating irregular migration has been an important part of a 
common EU immigration and asylum policy. It has been considered to be a necessary 
condition  due to the lack of border control between the EU-member states, see for 
example R Cholewinski, The EU acquis on Irregular Migration - Ten Years On in E 
Guild and P Minderhoud (eds) The First Decade of EU Migration and Asylum Law 
(Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012)175. 
39
 Council doc 15033/13, 25 October 2013, amendment 12, page 11. 
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sectors should depend upon the involvement of, and consultation with, the social 
partners.
40
 The majority of the Member States wanted temporary work agencies and 




The Directive gives Member States a great deal of flexibility to determine which sectors 
are seasonal, and only contemplates a limited role for the social partners. ‘An activity 
dependent on the passing of the seasons’ is defined as ‘an activity that is tied to a certain 
time of the year by a recurring event or pattern of events linked to seasonal conditions 
during which required labour levels are significantly above those necessary for usually 
ongoing operations’ (Article 3 c). When transposing the Directive, Member States must 
list those sectors that are considered to be seasonal, and, if appropriate, the list should be 
drawn up in consultation with the social partners (Article 2.2). The preamble indicates 
that ‘activities dependent on the passing of the seasons are typically to be found in sectors 
such as agriculture and horticulture, in particular during the planting or harvesting period, 
or tourism, especially during the holiday period’ (recital 13). The Member States’ 
aversion to either formulating or limiting the kind of sectors to which seasonal workers 
could be recruited must be understood in light of their wish to maintain control over the 
inflow to their labour markets and their desire to organize their labour markets without 
any EU-based restrictions.  
 
Member States were successful in ensuring that third-country based agencies or other 
third-country based service providers are excluded from the scope of the Directive.
42
 By 
excluding specific kinds of working arrangements from the scope of the Directive, some 
Member States hoped to minimize the risk that the Directive would be abused by 
employers who were located in third countries, and beyond their direct supervision, to 
sponsor workers who were not really seasonal workers. 
 
It is, however, possible for a Member State to allow employment agencies based in the 
Member State to avail themselves of the procedures adopted under the Directive. This 
practice is permitted under Recital 12 of the preamble, which was introduced after a few 
Member States objected to the explicit exclusion of employment agencies from the scope 
of the Directive on the ground both that this decision should be left to them and that 
workers who are employed through agencies should be protected under the Directive.
43
   
 
The Directive explicitly excludes posting within the EU from its scope (Article 2.3.a). 
The European Parliament was unsuccessful in its attempt explicitly to prohibit (in Article 
2) an employer who has a contract with a seasonal worker from posting that worker to 
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 Recital 11 confirms that such a limitation was not intended and 
it is not likely that the legal basis of the Directive (Article 79) can be used to limit the 
mobility rights of service providers.   
.  
Is the Directive the Exclusive Means for Member States to Admit Seasonal Workers From 
Third Countries?  
Does the Directive prevent Member States from using other procedures for admitting 
seasonal workers or is it the exclusive procedure? The answer to this question is critical 
for determining whether the Directive met the central objective of creating a level field 
for the recruitment of seasonal workers across the Member States, and it depends upon 
the type of seasonal workers immigration scheme under consideration. When discussing 
the linkage between migration and development, the Commission made it clear that the 
Directive was designed to complement, and not to replace, multilateral partnership 
agreements and bilateral agreements between the EU and/or one or more Member States, 
on the one hand, and third countries on the other. The only requirement is that the 
agreement ‘adopt or retain more favourable provisions for third-country nationals’ 
(Article 4). Member States can continue to give priority to migrant workers from specific 
third countries, and here we can see that development goals combined with Member 
States’ desire for a reliable and efficient source of seasonal labour through partnership 
agreements compromised the aim of achieving a level playing field. However, the 
Directive prevents Member States from admitting seasonal workers through other 
temporary migration schemes.  
Harmonizing Admission Rules  
The Commission’s primary objective was to establish harmonized admissions 
procedures. Common rules across the Member States would enable migrant seasonal 
workers to change destination easily from year to year in response to Member State 
demands. Simple and transparent rules would not only facilitate admission to EU 
territory, the Commission reasoned that seasonal migrant workers would choose to enter 
the EU territory through the legal route. In this way, harmonized admission rules served a 
dual purpose.  
 
Although both goals are important with respect to any group of migrant workers, 
ensuring fair competition for labour supply is more compelling with regard to highly 
skilled workers, whereas stemming the flow of irregular migrants tends to have greater 
purchase with respect to low-skilled workers. For example, the goal of allocating migrant 
workers to Member States with the highest demand has led to a successful discussion of 
mobility within the EU as a necessary next step for highly skilled workers and intra-
corporate transferees.
45
 However, easing up the EU-internal border control in relation to 
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low-skilled workers is not on the agenda. Seasonal workers will have to be satisfied with 
a right to enter, stay, and to free access to the territory in and of the Member State that 
issued the authorization (Article 22).  
 
The Commission pushed for common admission criteria, and this objective was also 
voiced early in the negotiations by the Presidency, which emphasized that unless the 
Member States adopted an exhaustive list of criteria for admission, refusal, withdrawal, 





Quite late in the negotiations, it became apparent that the admission rules had to take the 
Schengen acquis and the Visa code into account, which meant that different provisions 
would apply depending on whether or not a Member State applies the Schengen acquis in 
full and the length of the migrant’s stay (three months being the critical cut off). Thus, the 
Directive includes six different routes to seasonal employment to a EU Member State. 
However, for those workers who are admitted for stays of longer than 90 days the 
Directive defines both the conditions for admission to and stay in the territory and the 
criteria and requirements for access to employment in the Member States (recitals 19-22). 
The following discussion will concentrate on the admission requirements as they pertain 
to stays in excess of 90 days despite the minor differences pertaining to stays less than 90 
days.  
 
Although the admission criteria are the same, Member States can choose what to call the 
authorization to work – a long stay visa that indicates it is for seasonal work, a seasonal 
work permit, and a seasonal work permit and a long stay visa  – as well as how to 
structure it. However, the Directive requires Member States to select only one of the 
options (Article 12).  
 
Admission Criteria 
The admission system contemplated by the Directive is employer driven, subject to the 
Member State’s right to impose limits on the numbers of migrants admitted. It is up to the 
Member State to decide whether the employee or the employer is required to submit the 
application (Article12.3), although it is mandatory for the application to be accompanied 
by a valid work contract or a binding job offer (Article 6.1.a). Moreover, these documents 
must provide specified information, and here the European Parliament’s ambition to 
safeguard the workers’ rights had an impact. Although the Commission’s original 
proposal required the contract to stipulate the remuneration and hours of work, the 
Parliament also ensured that the contract or offer includes the place and type of work, the 
duration of the employment, and the amount of any paid leave.
47
 Furthermore, the 
Council added the requirement that these conditions conform to applicable laws, 
collective agreements, and/or practices (Article 6.2), which also enhances the equality 
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These provisions should ensure that migrant workers know what to expect and should 
give them a way to prove the conditions of employment in the event of a dispute. 
However, it is unclear what legal effect these documents will have. In some jurisdictions, 
such as Sweden for example, a job offer entered into as part of the immigration process 
does not have legal effect, only the contract of employment does.
49
 Unless these 
documents are legally enforceable, this requirement will not have much value as a form 
of protection.  
 
The Directive also requires that the applicant demonstrate that the migrant is covered by 
health insurance (Article 6.1.b), has adequate accommodation (Article 6.1.c), and has 
sufficient resources without having recourse to social assistance (Article 6.3). The 
Member State is also required to verify that the third country national does not present a 
risk of illegal immigration (Article 6.5) and that he or she has valid travel document 
(Article 6.7). Article 6.5 states that ‘third-country nationals considered to pose a threat to 
public policy, public security or public health hall not be admitted.’ Even here some 
permissive ‘may’ provisions made their way into Directive, and they relate to the details 
of the travel document and proof of having the necessary skills for regulated professions 
(Article 6.6, 6.7).  
 
Article 20, which is linked to the admission criteria under Article 6.1.c, is designed to 
ensure that employers do not exploit migrant workers through excessive housing charges 
or providing unacceptable accommodation. It is within the discretion of the Member 
State to determine whether workers are free to arrange their own accommodation or 
whether it is the employer’s responsibility. However, if the employer provides 
accommodation, paragraph 2 of Article 23 contains a number of safeguards (the rent must 
not be excessive and not be automatically deducted from the wages, a rental contract 
shall be provided, and the accommodation shall meet general health and safety 
standards). 
 
Application fees relating to labour migration are controversial, and excessive fees are 
seen as an indication of exploitation.
50
 Member States wanted the discretion to charge the 
application fees;
51
 the European Parliament wanted employers to pay the fees if they 
were imposed.
52
 The Council suggested a compromise, which was adopted in the 
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Directive; ‘Member States may require the payment of fees for the handling of 
applications’ but that ‘the level of fees shall not be disproportionate or excessive’ (Article 
19.1). The European Parliament’s concern about fees was also accommodated by 
providing that Member States may require employers to reimburse the workers for any 
application fees, traveling costs, and sickness insurance premiums (Article 19.2). This 
compromise, however, leaves it within the discretion of Member States to decide whether 
or not to impose these costs on employers.  
 
During the negotiations, the Commission was largely successful in ensuring that the 
criteria were not too burdensome, and the additions that were made where done so at 
European Parliament’s initiative in order to protect migrant workers. 
 
Rejecting and Withdrawing an Application 
The criteria for rejecting an application can be used to try to ensure that the employer will 
treat the worker decently and adhere to the standards and requirements set out in the 
Directive (Article 8). The European Parliament tried, largely unsuccessfully, to introduce 
criteria that would enhance the protection of the workers and protect them from 
unscrupulous employers. Although the Member States could have regarded these efforts 
as protecting their national workforce by limiting the opportunities to exploit migrant 
workers, the result suggests that most of the stakeholders wanted to avoid imposing 
detailed rules relating to the organization of national labour market and the administration 
of applications.  
 
The provisions governing the rejection of applications in Article 8 contemplate three 
different types or tiers of criteria, which range from those to which Members States are 
required to adhere to those that they have discretion to impose. The first tier originated 
from the Commission’s proposal – an application shall be rejected if the admission 
criteria in Article 6 are not complied with or the relevant documents are fraudulently 
required. Under the second tier, the Member States shall, if appropriate, reject an 
application if the employer has been sanctioned for undeclared work or illegal 
employment,
53
 the employer’s business is being or has been wound up under national 
insolvency laws or no economic activity is taking place, or the employer has either been 
sanctioned for or failed to fulfill its obligations under the Directive. In the third tier,  
Member States may reject an application if the employer has 1) failed to meet its legal 
obligations regarding social security, taxation, labour rights, working conditions or terms 
of employment as provided for in applicable law and/or collective agreement; 2) has, 
within the 12 months immediately preceding the date of the application, abolished a full-
time position in order to create the vacancy that the employer is trying to fill through the 
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Directive; or 3) the third-country national has not complied with the obligations arising 
from a previous decision on admission as a seasonal worker. 
 
All three EU actors involved in the negotiation process appear to have agreed on the first 
tier of criteria for rejecting applications – the pure shall reasons for rejection. However, 
they parted company over the next two tiers of rejection criteria. The European 
Parliament wanted all the grounds for rejecting an application to be framed in shall 
clauses, whereas the Member States preferred to frame all of the other requirements, 
including the situation where an employer has abolished a full-time position in order to 
recruit a migrant worker, as discretionary (‘may’) clauses.54 Member States wanted the 
discretion to protect their nationals, either by refusing applications where nationals had 
been terminated or by verifying whether the positions could not be filled by a national of 
the Member State, Union citizens or by third-country nationals already residing in the 
Member States (Article 8.3). However, they did not want to be required to reject 
applications in such situations. Thus, Member States retained the discretion to impose 
labour market tests. 
 
The Commission wanted to close the door completely to those migrant workers who had 
previously overstayed. However, the European Parliament and Member States agreed to 
transform a migrant worker’s violation of previous permits from a mandatory to a 
permissive reason for rejection.
55
 The Parliament also succeeded in adding Article 8.5, 
which provides, with the exception of those grounds for rejecting an application that are 
mandatory upon Member States, that the interests of seasonal worker must be taken into 
account in any decision to reject an application.
56
 It is important, however, to note that 
Member States are free to reject applications by third-country nationals who have 
violated previous permits.  
 
The negotiations resulted in a set of criteria for rejecting applications that, at first sight, 
seem to require Member States to carry out a more thorough and time-consuming 
investigation than many wanted. However, the extent of the actual burdens imposed by 
the second tier of grounds for rejecting applications – which are framed in terms of ‘shall, 
if appropriate’ – is unclear. If it is within the sole authority of the Member State to 
determine whether it is appropriate to reject an application in a case where, for example, 
an employer has been sanctioned for employing undeclared workers, this is, in effect, a 
discretionary requirement. The Directive does not stipulate who has the authority to 
determine appropriateness in this context. Member States also have the choice to impose 
the additional requirements contemplated by the third tier of criteria, which are those 
expressed as may clauses. The possibility for Member States to consider all the criteria in 
rejecting an application, which would go a long way towards ensuring that workers are 
admitted to work under the conditions the Directive prescribes, was a counterweight to 
the Commission’s goal of establishing a simple and transparent procedure that facilitates 
entry.   
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The provisions in Article 9 governing the withdrawal of authorization for seasonal 
workers are constructed along the lines of the tiered approached to rejections, and they 
involve the same criteria. Member States also secured the discretion to withdraw an 





Time Limits for Processing Applications 
In opposition to the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament wanted the 
Directive to provide for fast authorization procedures.
58
 However, the Council prevailed 
since the Directive requires that a decision on the application for authorization for the 
purpose of seasonal work shall be taken as soon as possible, but not later than 90 days 
from the date when the application was submitted (Article 18).
59
 
Minimum and Maximum Lengths of Stay 
The Directive is the first directive to cover stays of a shorter duration than three months 
Although the admission procedures for seasonal workers staying less than three months 
are a bit different from those provided for longer stays and, thus, compromises the goal of 
transparency, the workers admitted for shorter stays are covered by all of the protections 




Over the opposition of the Commission and the European Parliament, the Member States 
were able to obtain a great deal of flexibility over the maximum duration of a seasonal 
workers stay.
61
 The Commission argued that a strict limitation of six months per calendar 
year would contribute to ensuring that seasonal workers were admitted for genuinely 
seasonal, and not regular, work.
62
 The Member States could not, however, agree on a 
common time limit due to the different lengths of their seasons.
63
 Article 14 provides that 
the maximum period of stay for seasonal workers can vary from five to nine months in 
any twelve-month period. Once again the result is a less harmonized system. 
Circular migration 
The Commission’s commitment to circular migration suffered during the negotiation 
process. Initially, it proposed a multi-seasonal permit option, which would have allowed 
for the issuance of three permits covering three seasons, arguing that this provision would 
not only promote the EU’s development goals, but also that it would help to cultivate a 
stable and trained workforce for EU employers.
64
 However, the problem was that the 
Commission’s proposal affected the ability of Member States to control their borders and, 
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therefore, was not acceptable. The provisions that were ultimately adopted governing re-
entry are weaker and they leave much more to the discretion of Member States. Although 
Article 16 requires Member States to facilitate the re-entry of migrant workers who have 
been admitted to that Member State at least once during the previous five years, the 
means of facilitating re-entry are completely within the discretion of the Member State. 
Article 16 lists four measures that Member States may adopt in order to facilitate the re-
entry of seasonal workers. However, it is unclear what mechanisms Member States must 
put in place to facilitate circular migration since these measures are part of a non-
exhaustive list (‘may include one or more such measures’) and they are not expressed as 
minimum requirements, What began as a commitment to promoting the circulation of 
third-country national seasonal workers (recital 17) became ‘the possibility of facilitated 
admission procedures’ in the adopted Directive (recital 34). 
 
2. Protection from Social and Economic Exploitation 
Equal Treatment with Nationals 
The Directive also provides for rights for third-country seasonal workers along with for 
immigration controls. The core of a rights-based approach to labour migration is the 
principle that migrants shall be entitled to equal treatment with nationals in the host state. 
The article on the right to equal treatment in the Directive changed considerably during 
the negotiations. The difference between the Commission’s proposal and the adopted 
Article 23 is, perhaps, the clearest illustration of the Commission’s misconception of 
what kind of minimum standard a EU directive that is supposed to provide for worker 
protection must contain. 
 
Article 23 expressly embodies the equal treatment principle, providing that seasonal 
workers are to be treated equally to nationals at least with regard to nine enumerated 
categories of rights. The first paragraphs of Article 23 covers terms of employment, 
including the minimum working age, and working conditions, including pay and 
dismissal, working hours, leave and holidays, as well as health and safety requirements in 
the workplace. The Commission’s original proposal did not provide for equal treatment 
on working conditions, and it was severely criticized in this respect by the ILO.
65
 
However, the Council and the European Parliament agreed on equal treatment regarding 
working conditions, and the Parliament was able to strengthen this provision.
66
 An earlier 
reference to conditions in specific types of collective agreements, which the Commission 
copied form the Posted Workers Directive, was dropped.
67
 Member States can decide the 
basis on which the conditions of the seasonal workers will be equalized with those of 
national workers. 
 
In its second paragraph, Article 23 provides for equal treatment with regard to the right to 
strike and freedom of association. Although the Commission and the Council were in 
agreement on wording, the European Parliament pushed to include language that would 
have explicitly included the right to strike within the freedom of association. With a 
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slight modification, the European Parliament was successful in obtaining the wording it 
wanted. 
 
The majority of the equal treatment entitlements specified in Article 23 have to do with 
various forms of social entitlements. Article 23.1.d provides that seasonal migrant 
workers are entitled to those branches of social security defined in Article 3 of Regulation 
no 883/2004, which include sickness benefits, maternity and equivalent paternity 
benefits, invalidity benefits, old-age benefits, survivors’ benefits, benefits in respect of 
accidents at work and occupational diseases, death grants, unemployment benefits, pre-
retirement benefits and family benefits. The Council demanded limitations on entitlement 
to social benefits, and as a result Member States have the discretion to compromise the 
equal treatment of migrant workers when it comes to accessing family and 
unemployment benefits (Article 23.2 i).
68
 The equal treatment provisions in the Directive 
derogate from those in the two ILO migrant workers conventions since the latter include 
equal treatment of migrants and nationals specifically with respect to ‘unemployment and 
family responsibilities’ and more generally regarding ‘social security’.69 However, 
Article 23.1, 2
nd
 paragraph specifically provides that migrant seasonal workers are 
entitled to receive statutory pensions based on the seasonal workers previous employment 
and acquired in accordance with the legislation set out in Article 3 of reg. 883/2004, 
when moving to a third country.  
 
Seasonal workers are entitled to have the same access to goods and services and, with the 
exception of housing services, the supply of goods made available to the public (Article 
23.1.e). In addition, migrant workers are, thanks to amendments proposed by the 
Parliament, entitled to equal treatment regarding education and vocational training; 
recognition of diplomas, certificates and other professional qualifications; and, in so far 
as the seasonal worker is deemed to be resident for tax purposes in the Member State 
concerned, tax benefits.
70
 The Commission and the Council also wanted to be able to 
exclude employment services from this Article.
71
 Instead, the Parliament was successful 
in ensuring that third country seasonal workers were granted equal access to any advisory 
services offered by employment services regarding seasonal work.  
 
The European Parliament also managed to secure a provision on back payments to be 
made by the employers regarding outstanding remuneration to the third-country 
national.
72
 Combined with the robust equal treatment approach, the Directive goes a long 
way to achieving the kind of rights-based approach to migration advocated by the ILO in 
its Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration.
73
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A Multi-faceted Approach to Enforcement 
The value of any rights depends, ultimately, on whether they can be enforced.  
Enforcement is a particular challenge when it comes to third-country migrant seasonal 
workers; they are sojourners in the host country, without political rights and lacking the 
status of citizens, and their migrant status is tied to an on-going employment relationship 
with the employer who sponsored them, making them particularly vulnerable to abuse. 
An enforcement mechanism must address the various dimensions of seasonal migrant 
workers’ vulnerability if it is to be effective. Thus, a multi-faceted approach to 
enforcement is critical.  
 
As a first step, it is essential to minimize the risks to which migrant workers who initiate 
complaints are exposed. Without the right to transfer employers, enforcement mechanism 
that are linked to the withdrawal of the employer’s authorisation to employ seasonal 
workers could also result in the worker’s losing her or his authorisation to work. In such 
cases, the ability of seasonal workers to claim obligations to which they would have been 
entitled had the work authorisation not been withdrawn on account of the employer’s 
violation is crucial.  
 
Another enforcement-related problem that arises with respect to seasonal work, 
especially in the agricultural sector, is the use of labour supply chains.
74
 Labour 
contractors often enter into arrangements with firms to supply them with a seasonal 
workforce. Although the seasonal worker’s employment contract is with the labour 
supplier, the principal contractor often controls the work that is on offer. In situations in 
which the labour supplier fails to pay wages, violates employment standards, or fails to 
adhere to the terms and conditions of employment, it is important for the seasonal 
workers to have a right of recourse against the principal contractor.  
 
No matter how many safeguards are provided to promote compliance, it is inevitable that 
complaints against employers who have failed to adhere to conditions provided for in the 
Directive will arise. Not only must effective complaint mechanisms be available to the 
seasonal migrant workers, these mechanisms should permit a third party like a trade 
union representative or a labour inspector to lodge complaints on behalf of seasonal 
workers. And, finally, external monitoring systems need to be put in place in order to 
ensure that the weakest party – the migrant seasonal worker – does not bear the entire 
burden of ensuring that employers meet their legal obligations under the Directive.  
 
Throughout the negotiations, the European Parliament proposed a number of 
amendments aimed at achieving a multi-faceted enforcement structure, traces of which 
can also be found in the Directive. The highly contentious discussions over the impact of 
posted workers on the EU labour market made it obvious to the Parliament that 
enforcement mechanisms are absolutely essential if migrant workers are to enjoy the 
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labour standards set out in a directive.
75
 In particular, migrants whose presence in a host 
country is dependent on another party might decide not to claim their rights since 
claiming them might jeopardize their ability to stay and work in the host country. 
However, Member States wanted to maintain their flexibility and did not want to be tied 
to any particular enforcement mechanism.
76
 In order to reach an agreement, the 
provisions relating to the enforcement of working conditions were split into mandatory 
and optional provisions.  
 
Workers’ Freedom to Prolong their Stay and Change Employers 
Article 15 includes a number of provisions that give seasonal workers some flexibility 
over the length of their stay in a Member State and that loosen the closeness of their ties 
to their employers. The ability of migrant workers to change employers is regarded as a 
critical to whether or not they can actually enforce in practice the rights to which on 
paper they are entitled.
77
 Although the provisions that were ultimately adopted were 
similar to that proposed by the Commission,
78
 there was a deep conflict between the 
Council and European Parliament over whether or not seasonal workers should have the 
right to change employers. The Council did not want Member States to be required under 
any circumstances to permit migrant workers to change employers, whereas the European 




In the end, there was a compromise. Member States are required to permit one extension 
with the same employer within the maximum period and they have the discretion to allow 
more than one extension with the same employer (Articles 15. 1 and 2). Member States 
are also required to allow seasonal workers to extend the stay once when changing 
employers (Article 15.3 and 4), and such applications can be submitted from within the 
Member State in question. The Member States, however, succeeded in obtaining a right 
to reject extension and renewal applications if the vacancy could be filled with other EU 
residents (Article 15.6). 
Monitoring and Inspections 
The European Parliament also succeeded in requiring Member States to ensure that 
mechanisms for monitoring, assessing, and inspecting whether or not employers are in 
compliance with the national instruments transposing the Directive.
80
 Under Article 24, 
Member States must ‘provide for measures to prevent possible abuses and to sanction 
infringements of this Directive’, including monitoring, assessment, and, where 
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appropriate, inspection in accordance with national law or administrative practice. Recital 
49 specifically recommends using risk assessments, based on sectors and past record of 
infringement, in selecting which employers to inspect. The Article (24.2) also requires 
that Member States provide the officials who are responsible for inspections and, where 
provided for under national law for national workers, organizations representing workers’ 
interests with access to the workplace and, with the worker’s agreement, to the worker’s 
accommodation. 
Facilitation of Employee Complaints 
The European Parliament also significantly strengthened the provisions relating to the 
facilitation of complaints.
81
 The Commission’s original proposal was only directed at 
third parties and their right to engage either on behalf of or in support of a seasonal 
worker in the administrative or civil proceedings provided for with the objective of 
implementing the Directive. In addition, two other provisions were added in order to 
facilitate complaints. Member States are required to ensure that there are effective 
mechanisms through which seasonal workers may lodge complaints against their 
employers directly, through specified third parties,
82
 or through a competent authority of 
the Member State when provided for by national law. Member States are also obligated 
to ensure that seasonal workers have the same access as other workers in a similar 
position to measures protecting against dismissal or other adverse treatment by the 
employer in retaliation for ‘a complaint within the undertaking or to any legal 
proceedings aimed at enforcing compliance with the directive’ (Article 25.3). 
Sanctions against Employers  
The stakeholders had different views on sanctions against employers who violated the 
conditions imposed by the Directive. The Commission originally proposed that a 
violation of the work contract would in itself generate sanctions including the exclusion 
from applications for seasonal workers for one or more subsequent years.
83
 While the 
Council agreed that Member States should be required to impose sanctions, it believed 
that Member States should have the discretion over the type of sanction to impose. By 
contrast, European Parliament wanted mandatory sanctions specified.
84
 As a compromise, 
the sanctioning provisions are constructed as mix of obligatory and optional clauses.  
 
According to Article 17.1, Member States are obliged to provide for sanctions against 
employers who have not fulfilled their obligations under this Directive, and these 
sanctions must be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. For employers who are in 
serious breach of their obligations under the Directive these sanctions must include their 
exclusion from employing seasonal migrant workers.  
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The Article (17.2) goes beyond sanctioning the employer to require the employer to 
compensate migrant workers in situations in which the employer’s work authorization is 
withdrawn for reasons that range from insolvency and employing undocumented worker  
(Article 9.2) to violating labour laws or working conditions (Article 9.3.b.). It is 
important to note that under the Directive,
85
 Member States have the discretion to link the 
withdrawal of work authorisations to a range of employer behaviour. In cases in which 
the Member State provides for the withdrawal of a work authorisation because, for 
example, the employer has either not fulfilled its obligations under the work contract or 
has failed to meet its legal obligations regarding social security, taxation, or labour rights, 
the employer is liable for any ‘outstanding’ obligations which the employer would have 
had to respect if the authorization for the purpose of seasonal work had not been 
withdrawn. This compensation provision protects the legitimate expectations of seasonal 
migrants in those Member States that link the withdrawal of work authorizations to 
violations of labour law and working conditions. It is designed to ensure that migrant 
workers do not have to ‘choose’ not to complain so as not to jeopardise these 
expectations.  
 
The only purely permissive clause in the sanctions provision relates to the liability in 
subcontracting chains (Article 17(3)), a provision that attracted little interest in the 
Council. In situations where the main contractor and intermediary subcontractors have 
not exercised due diligence with regard to a subcontractor’s infringements of the 
Directive, the Member State may sanction the entities higher up the chain for the 
subcontractor’s violation or make them liable for compensation or back pay owed by the 
subcontractor. Member States also have the discretion provide for more stringent liability 
rules under national law.  
 
 
IV. Conclusion  
 
Our analysis of the changes made to the text of the Directive from the original proposal to 
the version that was finally adopted illustrates the extent to which the Commission’s 
initial, and almost exclusive, preoccupation with the immigration side of the seasonal 
workers’ directive was modified by the European Parliament’s more labour-oriented 
concern to ensure that migrant workers were protected from exploitation. The 
Commission’s main goal was to achieve a common immigration scheme and a common 
level playing field for this sector. This ambition ran into conflict with Member States’ 
concerns to avoid negative effects on their national labour force, to retain flexibility, and 
to avoid burdensome administrative requirements.  
 
Although the Commission achieved common admission criteria and an exclusive 
admission route, subject to bilateral and multilateral agreements, for third-country 
seasonal workers in the Directive, which were central elements in its objective to create a 
                                                        
85
 Article 9(2) provides that ‘Member States shall, if appropriate, withdraw the 
authorsation’, whereas Article 9(3) states that ‘Member States may withdraw the 
authorisation...’ 
 22 
level field, its goal of promoting the circular migration of seasonal workers was severely 
compromised. So, too, were its attempts to achieve common grounds for rejecting an 
application and withdrawing a permit. To accommodate the different interests of the 
Member States and the European Parliament, the final provisions were drafted in a way 
that provided a great deal of flexibility to Member States, which allows them to 
implement very different admission structures. The Commission’s objective of providing 
a fast-track procedure also failed, as the Member States would not commit to 
administering the immigration controls within a shorter timeframe. Member States also 
managed to secure a great deal of flexibility in determining which sectors to designate as 
seasonal as well over the duration of a seasonal worker’s stay, and they are free to impose 
labour market tests. The Commission’s compromises regarding common immigration 
rules are mainly attributable to the need to accommodate the Member States’ concerns, 
although the European Parliament’s objectives also contributed, albeit to a more limited 
extent, to this result.  
 
Despite the Commission’s claim that its goal was to establish a structure for avoiding the 
exploitation of third-country seasonal migrant workers, the substantive provisions of its 
original proposal were so severely flawed that they call into question the sincerity of this 
ambition. While the adoption of a rigorous equal rights approach would have helped to 
create a level playing field with respect to immigration controls, it was the other EU 
institutions, and not the Commission, that championed this approach. The tensions 
between the European Parliament’s ambition to protect migrant workers and the Member 
States’ aversion to burdensome commitments and to interference with their national 
labour markets resulted in compromise that permits a wide degree of diversity. Despite 
the compromises required to accommodate the different interests, the Directive that was 
adopted is much more likely to be effective than the original proposal in preventing 
labour and social exploitation. 
 
The European Parliament was, often with the support of the Council, largely successful in 
ensuring that the Directive embodied an approach of treating migrant seasonal workers 
the same as national workers. However, the extent to which such an approach actually 
protects seasonal workers from exploitation depends upon two factors: the terms and 
conditions available to national workers in sectors designated as seasonal and the 
enforcement mechanisms available to them. With respect to the first, it is important to 
recall that Member States have found it necessary to recruit workers from third-countries 
because neither their national workers nor EU citizens have found seasonal work to be 
attractive. One of the limitations of an equal treatment approach is that if a Member State 
provides low standards for national workers in sectors that are designated seasonal, such 
as is often the case with the agricultural sector, all that migrants workers are entitled to is 
equally poor treatment. Regarding the second factor, while the European Parliament was 
successful in introducing a range of enforcement mechanisms into the Directive, some 
are discretionary rather than mandatory. Moreover, as is the case with the two ILO 
migrant workers conventions, there is nothing in the Directive that prevents a Member 
State from tying a migrant worker’s legal status to be in its territory to an on-going 
employment relationship with the sponsoring employer, a linkage which makes the 
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migrant worker vulnerable to abuse.
86
 The actual terms and conditions and legal rights to 
which seasonal migrant workers will be entitled, as well as how these conditions and 
rights will be enforced, remain within the purview of the Member States. However, 
unlike the Posted Workers Directive, the Seasonal Workers Directive allows the Member 
States more freedom, albeit within limits, to provide a greater protections and more 
robust standards that those set out in the Directive if they so choose.
87
    
 
Over the past fifteen years, the EU has followed a sector-by-sector approach to legal 
migration. This tack has resulted in legal frameworks for high-skilled workers, seasonal 
workers, and intra corporate transferees, which regulate the admission of certain 
categories of persons, recognizes rights, and, at least for the seasonal workers and, to a 
limited extent, for the intra corporate transferees, sanctions for violations.
88
 A Framework 
Directive for all other categories of migrant workers providing for a single permit, 
covering residence and work, as well as the rights to which migrants are entitled while 
working in the EU, has also been adopted.
89
 However, these Directives fall well short of 
the Commission’s goal of a common immigration policy for the EU. 
 
The obstacles the Commission faces are clearly illustrated by the process that led to the 
adoption of the Directive on seasonal workers. However, this Directive differs in 
significant respects from the other immigration directives. The Seasonal Workers 
Directive could be seen as charting a new path in EU immigration policy by providing an 
exclusive route for admission with a robust equal treatment approach that allows a great 
deal of flexibility for Member States regarding enforcement. Yet, the even more recently 
adopted Directive on Intra-corporate Transferees indicates that this is a path that the EU 
is either unable or unwilling to follow since this Directive does not provide for equal 
treatment of third-country corporate transferees with national workers and it is weak on 
enforcement mechanisms. Nonetheless, it is possible to characterize the groups of 
migrants covered by the Seasonal Workers’ Directive, on the one hand, and intra-
corporate transferees, on the other, as so distinct that a common immigration framework 
is simply impossible.  
 
A unique aspect of the negotiations over the Seasonal Workers Directive was the extent 
to which the European Parliament was unified in its ambition to strengthen the rights of 
seasonal workers. No such similar concern was evident with respect to the groups of 
migrant workers that were the subjects of the other immigration directives.  
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With the expiry of the Stockholm programme, the European Council will set new 
strategic guidelines for further development of the area of freedom, security, and justice. 
In its communication regarding the new programme, the Commission announced that the 
legal framework for a common migration policy is still to be completed,
90
 and that it is 
time to consolidate existing measures within a more coherent EU common migration 
policy that takes into account the short-and long-term economic needs.
91
 It believes that a 
common immigration framework is necessary for the economic recovery and that more 
people will want to come to Europe – some temporarily, such as tourists, students, and 
service providers, others on a more permanent basis to work or to seek protections.  
 
Although the Commission emphasizes that all Member States must implement the 
existing EU rules on admission of migrants and on their rights in an effective and 
coherent way,
92
 the flexible legislative style used in the Directive on Seasonal Workers 
may undermine this goal. Despite these compromises, this Directive has the potential to 
promote the protection of third-country migrant seasonal workers while they are working 
in the EU. It is now the responsibility of Member States to fulfill it. 
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